Contact

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Academic Positions The George Washington University, School of Business
Department of Strategic Management & Public Policy
Teaching Assistant Professor, August 2021 – Present

Duke University, Department of Political Science **Postdoctoral Associate**, August 2019 – July 2021

Education

Stanford University

Ph.D. in Business Administration (Political Economy), 2019

Dissertation committee: Ken Shotts (adviser), Jonathan Bendor, Keith Krehbiel

Vanderbilt University

B.A. in Economics (with highest honors) and Mathematics, 2014 magna cum laude

Research Interests American Political Institutions, Political Economy, Formal Theory, Legislative Process, Federalism, Separation of Powers, Public Finance

Published Works Choate, T., J.A. Weymark, and A.E. Wiseman. 2020. "Legislative Bargaining and Partisan Delegation." *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 32(2), 289–311.

Choate, T., J.A. Weymark, and A.E. Wiseman. 2019. "Partisan Strength and Legislative Bargaining." *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 31(1), 6–45.

Choate, T. 2018. "State Leviathan and Tax Competition under a Federal Constitution." In *Exploring the Political Economy and Social Philosophy of James M. Buchanan*, 165–189. Aligica, Paul Dragos, Christopher J. Coyne & S. Haeffele, eds. London: Rowman & Littlefield International.

Working Papers "Textual Ambiguity in the Legislative Process"

Revise & resubmit at Journal of Theoretical Politics

I construct a model to examine the *intra*-legislature causes of ambiguous laws. Unlike prior theories, which consider ambiguity as a tool for delegation, this approach explains the frequency of *inefficient* ambiguities in laws.

"Policy Conflict and the Distribution of Government Capacity"

Linking work on diversity, political development, and federalism, I model how policy conflict constrains the absolute level and hierarchical distribution of state capacity.

"Optimal Voting Rules on Multiple Dimensions"

I show that a standard model of ethnic fractionalization and public goods provision implies super-majority voting rules are optimal under general conditions.

"Bad-Reputation Agents"

Employing a simple model of moral reputation, I examine under what conditions a principal may choose an agent who is known to be a "bad" actor.

Work in Progress "Constitutional Constraints and Government Capacity"

"Ambiguous Regulation"

Teaching

Instructor, The George Washington University, School of Business Markets and Politics (undergraduate), Fall 2021

Instructor, Duke University, Department of Political Science Congressional Policy-Making (undergraduate and graduate), Spring 2020

Course Assistant, Stanford Graduate School of Business Ethics in Management (MBA): Prof. Ken Shotts, 2017 & 2018 People Management Strategy (MBA): Prof. Katherine Shaw, 2018 Strategy Beyond Markets (MBA): Prof. David Broockman & Dana Foarta, 2017

Teaching Assistant, Vanderbilt University, Managerial Studies Department Financial Accounting (undergraduate): Prof. Brent Trentham, 2012 & 2013

Select Talks

American Political Science Association Conference, online, October 2021 Presented "Policy Conflict and the Distribution of Government Capacity"

Intl. Conference on Social Choice & Voting Theory, online, June 2021
Sponsored by Kellogg Center for Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, Virginia Tech
Presented "Optimal Voting Rules on Multiple Dimensions"
Chair for Democracy, Voting, and Juries session

Midwest Political Science Association Conference, online, April 2021

Presented "Policy Conflict and the Distribution of Government Capacity"

Chair and discussant for Legislative and Judicial Institutions session

APSA Formal Theory Section Virtual Workshop, Zoom, October 2020 Presented "Textual Ambiguity in the Legislative Process"

Public Choice Society Meeting, Charleston, SC, March 2018 Presented "Legislative Bargaining and Partisan Delegation"

Econometric Society North American Meeting, St. Louis, MO, June 2017 Presented "Partisan Strength and Legislative Bargaining"

Awards, Grants & Fellowships PhD Fellowship, Stanford Graduate School of Business (2014 – 2019)

Humane Studies Fellowship, Institute for Humane Studies (2016 – 2019)

Adam Smith Fellowship, The Mercatus Center at George Mason Univ. (2015 – 2017)

Finegan Prize for Best Honors Thesis in Economics, Vanderbilt University (2014)

University and Other Service Undergraduate Programs Core Faculty & Staff Committee, GWSB (2021 – Present)

Referee for International Economic Review (2020), Journal of Politics (2020), Quarterly Journal of Political Science (2020), The Independent Review (2018)