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A c a d e m i c
P o s i t i o n s

The George Washington University, School of Business
Department of Strategic Management & Public Policy
    Teaching Assistant Professor, August 2021 – Present

Duke University, Department of Political Science
    Postdoctoral Associate, August 2019 – July 2021

E d u c a t i o n

Stanford University
    Ph.D. in Business Administration, 2019

Vanderbilt University
    B.A. in Economics (highest honors) and Mathematics, 2014
    magna cum laude

R e s e a r c h
I n t e r e s t s

Nonmarket Strategy, American Political Institutions, Political Economy
Legislative Process, Federalism, Separation of Powers, Game Theory

P u b l i s h e d
W o r k s

Choate, T., J.A. Weymark, and A.E. Wiseman. 2020. "Legislative Bargaining and Partisan Delegation." *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 32(2), 289–311.

Choate, T., J.A. Weymark, and A.E. Wiseman. 2019. "Partisan Strength and Legislative Bargaining." *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 31(1), 6–45.

Choate, T. 2018. "State Leviathan and Tax Competition under a Federal Constitution." In *Exploring the Political Economy and Social Philosophy of James M. Buchanan*, 165–189. Aligica, Paul Dragos, Christopher J. Coyne & S. Haeffele, eds. London: Rowman & Littlefield International.

W o r k i n g
P a p e r s

"Textual Ambiguity in the Legislative Process"
I construct a model to examine the *intra*-legislature causes of ambiguous laws. Unlike prior theories, which consider ambiguity as a tool for delegation, this approach explains the frequency of *inefficient* ambiguities in laws.

"Policy Conflict and the Distribution of Government Capacity"
Linking work on diversity, political development, and federalism, I model how policy conflict constrains the absolute level and hierarchical distribution of state capacity.

"Optimal Voting Rules on Multiple Dimensions"
I show that a standard model of ethnic fractionalization and public goods provision implies super-majority voting rules are optimal under general conditions.

"Why Choose an Agent with a Bad Moral Reputation?"
Employing a simple model of moral reputation, I examine under what conditions a principal may choose an agent who is known to be a "bad" actor.

T e a c h i n g	**Instructor**, The George Washington University, School of Business
	Business Ethics and Public Policy (MBA), *Fall 2023 & Spring 2025*
	Business Ethics and Public Policy (accelerated MBA – 5-weeks), *Spring 2024*
	Markets and Politics (undergraduate), *Fall 2021 through Spring 2025*

Instructor, Duke University, Department of Political Science
    Congressional Policy-Making (undergraduate and graduate), *Spring 2020*

Course Assistant, Stanford Graduate School of Business
    Ethics in Management (MBA): *Prof. Ken Shotts, 2017 & 2018*
    People Management Strategy (MBA): *Prof. Katherine Shaw, 2018*
    Strategy Beyond Markets (MBA): *Prof. David Broockman & Dana Foarta, 2017*

University &
Professional
Service

Educational Policy & Technology Committee, GW Faculty Senate (2022 – Present)
Co-chair of committee (May 2025 – Present)
    Future Enrollment Planning subcommittee (2023 – Present)
    Academic Integrity Code Review subcommittee (2022 –2025)
    Generative AI in Writing in the Disciplines working group (2024)

Fiscal Planning & Budgeting Committee, GW Faculty Senate (May 2025 – Present)

Undergraduate Programs Core Faculty & Staff Committee, GWSB (2021 – Present)

Curriculum & Programs Committee, SM&PP Department (2022 – Present)

Physical Facilities Committee, GW Faculty Senate (2022 – 2025)

Referee for *American Journal of Political Science*, *International Economic Review*, *Journal of Politics*, *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*

Select
Presentations

Mercatus Center Markets & Society Conference, Falls Church, VA, Oct. 2022
    Presented "Why Choose an Agent with a Bad Moral Reputation?"

Midwest Political Science Association Conference, online, April 2022
    Presented "Why Choose an Agent with a Bad Moral Reputation?"
    Chair and discussant for Legislative Politics: Bargaining and Delegation session

American Political Science Association Conference, online, October 2021
    Presented "Policy Conflict and the Distribution of Government Capacity"

Intl. Conference on Social Choice & Voting Theory, online, June 2021
Sponsored by Kellogg Center for Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, Virginia Tech
    Presented "Optimal Voting Rules on Multiple Dimensions"
    Chair for Democracy, Voting, and Juries session

Midwest Political Science Association Conference, online, April 2021
    Presented "Policy Conflict and the Distribution of Government Capacity"
    Chair and discussant for Legislative and Judicial Institutions session

Econometric Society North American Meeting, St. Louis, MO, June 2017
    Presented "Partisan Strength and Legislative Bargaining"

Awards,
Grants &
Fellowships

PhD Fellowship, Stanford Graduate School of Business (2014 – 2019)

Humane Studies Fellowship, Institute for Humane Studies (2016 – 2019)

Adam Smith Fellowship, The Mercatus Center at George Mason Univ. (2015 – 2017)